ROOTS OF FREEDOM : I N T R O D U C T I O N

On June 6, 1995, The Wall Street Journal published an editorial entitled "RFE/RL R.I.P." to mark the downsizing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. These twin broadcasting services, launched by the U.S. early in the Cold War and headquartered in Munich, had for decades beamed radio transmissions into the communist East Bloc nations and the former Soviet Union, in an attempt to provide independent Western-style news and analysis to the peoples locked behind the iron curtain.

Terms like "East Bloc" and "iron curtain" already have a quaint ring to them, and will soon require special explanation. Yet less than a decade ago, next door to the advanced industrial nations that make up what was not long ago called the "free world," scores of millions of people lived under communist tyrannies which denied them free speech, the freedom to own property, and even the possibility of emigration. How quickly we forget.

In addition to acting as an objective news service for subjects of communist regimes, the two radios tried to give the people of communist regimes access to the ideas that formed the roots of free societies. Communist rulers knew how corrosive free thought would be to the iron curtain—they imposed stiff penalties for listening to the broadcasts, and lavished megawatts to jam them.

In 1988 the director of Radio Liberty, S. Enders Wimbush, asked me to write a series of articles for the radios. He requested brief and clear accounts of the thought of philosophers such as Locke, or Adam Smith, for broadcast on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

As I began writing the series, I realized that my listeners needed more than an overview of the great individual philosophers; they also needed a description of the historical periods and movements, such as the Protestant Reformation or the American founding, which influenced the growth of free societies. Locke and Adam Smith—along with less-known philosophers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hume, and Montesquieu—had indeed planted and watered the roots of our modern free societies, but those roots thrived or withered because of a historical climate.

Broadcasts of the series began in September of 1989. Time passed; the Berlin Wall fell; and the East Bloc was no more.

I took considerable pride in the series of articles, but, thinking they had served their purpose, thought little more about them. Some individuals, however, who had seen or knew about the series, pointed out that it would be of value to people outside the former communist world. They suggested to me that I should adapt the series to the citizens of free societies who wanted to know more about the philosophical and historical foundations of political freedom. The articles that were once broadcast beyond the iron curtain became the chapters of this book.

Many years ago I had the privilege of teaching in "the core," as it was called, in the undergraduate college at The University of Chicago. I have never forgotten the opening lines of one of the collections of readings we used, a book called The People Shall Judge.

This book expresses the faith of one American college in the usefulness of liberal education to American democracy. If the United States is to be a democracy, its citizens must be free. If citizens are to be free, they must be their own judges. If they are to judge well, they must be wise. Citizens may be born free; they are not born wise. Therefore, the business of liberal education in a democracy is to make free men wise.

It seems to me that those words are if anything more important now, at the end of the twentieth century, than when they were written decades ago. For despite the end of the Cold War and the apparent triumph of the principles of liberal democracy, societies such as the United States are vulnerable to a danger which was scarcely foreseen in 1949, when The People Shall Judge first appeared: the collapse of the belief in human nature. Free societies such as ours were once thought to be best precisely because they were in accord with human nature. Thus free societies are especially vulnerable to developments that undermine the notion of human nature itself. That collapse, which I will describe fully later, has become increasingly apparent in the twentieth century—a century that has not been favorable for free societies.

What is a free society? People would surely differ on this, but what is meant here is a society in which human beings are not "born into" a place—a caste or an occupation, for example—but are free to own property, to raise children, to earn a living, to think, worship, and to express political views, and even to emigrate if desired, and to do so without seeking permission from a master. Obviously no human being lives without constraint of many sorts, including physical constraints (gravity, or the need to eat). The moral obligation to care for offspring or for aged parents, for example, has always limited human freedom. But for much of human history, including recent history, most human beings have lived in circumstances more constraining than those that would be acceptable to, say, someone who lives in the United States—a free society—today.

Free societies have been, in human history, rare. They also seem to be fragile—more fragile than were the dynasties or empires of the ancient world, for example, or even the great republics of antiquity, Sparta and Rome. Why they are rare and fragile is worth serious reflection. As the twenty-first century approaches, there are still relatively few free societies. Why are they so rare in human history? This question can be approached indirectly, by thinking about the topic of liberal education.

Three Obstacles
Liberal education, to the ancients who first conceived it, was the education appropriate for a free man, that is, for a human being who was not enslaved. But of course there is more than one kind of slavery: one can be enslaved to a master, but one can also be enslaved by necessity—there is no freedom for one who has to work every waking minute just to survive. In the ancient world the free man or gentleman was free precisely because someone else was enslaved: the free man was free because he did not need to work for a living. This helps to explain why free societies have been so rare in history. For many centuries only a few could be free because their freedom depended on the enslavement of others. Genuine freedom requires some escape from economic necessity.

By about the end of the eighteenth century, economic necessity ceased to be the main obstacle to freedom in many places. The productive powers of emerging commercial societies allowed a substantial part of the population to enjoy some leisure. In 1776 Adam Smith, the Scottish moral philosopher, published An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. The introduction and plan of the work contains this observation:

Among the savage nations of hunters and fishers, every individual who is able to work, is more or less employed in useful labour, and endeavors to provide...for himself, or such of his family or tribe as are either too old, or too young, or too infirm to go a hunting and fishing. Such nations, however, are so miserably poor, that...they are frequently reduced...to the necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning their infants, their old people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be devoured by wild beasts.

Smith went on to contrast this state of affairs with the condition of emerging commercial societies such as Britain:

Among civilized and thriving nations, on the contrary, though a great number of people do not labour at all...yet the produce of the whole labour of the society is so great, that all are often abundantly supplied, and a workman, even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire. Certainly by the twentieth century, if not by 1776, economic advances had overcome one of the great obstacles to liberty, in the commercial societies.

Economic progress, however, though necessary, is not sufficient to achieve a free society. Certain political arrangements are equally indispensable. A tyrannical regime may oppress individuals even when they live in relatively prosperous circumstances. Thus we must add some notion of individual rights to our definition of a free society: the individual must be prior to the state or community. It follows that government powers must be limited. Of course, the most despotic of modern states have paid lip service to the notion of individual rights and limited government, but free societies have established institutional checks and balances to make the notion a reality. One such check is the separation of governmental powers. As James Madison said in The Federalist Papers, "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."

To separation of powers (which implies rule of law and independent judiciary) one might add the rights of revolution and emigration, as good indicators of the political arrangements of a free society. Students of political science would point to the British and American constitutional orders as the clearest examples of the political arrangements consistent with free society.

But while economic sufficiency and freedom from oppression are necessary for a free society, they are not enough. They form, so to speak, the physical requirements of free society, but there is still need of a spirit. And so we return to the dilemma I mentioned above as particularly troubling in our century: our belief in human nature.

A free society requires order, and order depends on restraint: yet it seems that the only kind of restraint compatible with genuine freedom is self-restraint. Thus a free society cannot long exist if its citizens don't consider self-restraint a virtue. And the twentieth century has given us ample reason for concern about this most difficult requirement.

It is in some of the most "advanced" of the industrial countries, with liberal constitutions and economic prosperity, that we most easily see the lack of self-restraint. The hedonism of individual pleasure-seeking, the sense that there is no limit to what is permitted in the name of individual fulfillment or "actualization," the disappearance of any sense of obligations—these are early warnings of a free society's decay.

The sexual revolution, which began in the 1960s, has highlighted this rather starkly in the U.S. and Western Europe. The rate of illegitimacy has soared over the past three decades, leading to all the turmoil that appears when the civilizing force of the family disappears. Teenage boys who never had a father to teach them civilized behavior—which requires, at a minimum, learning how to control anger—torment inner city neighborhoods in gangs. Not surprisingly this has turned cities or parts of cities into savage and fearsome places, where the idea of a free society is foreign.

Although most suburbs have not experienced the torrent of lawlessness common in inner cities, there is no question that the tide is rising, and there is growing apprehension about the dangers which confront us. Some have suggested that we are threatened by a sort of barbarism not seen since the dark ages. Even Hollywood movie-makers have appropriated the idea of society in decline for such movies as RoboCop and The Terminator.

What has happened?
The troubles that beset advanced industrial countries should serve to remind us how fragile—as well as rare—free societies are. Throughout human history, times of severe crisis (such as times of plague or civil war) have shown that human beings are apt to abandon all social and even self-restraint when conditions are dire enough. The celebrated Greek historian Thucydides wrote powerfully about the breakdown of civilized behavior in Athens during the terrible plague during the Peloponnesian War in 430 B.C. "...Athens owed to the plague the beginnings of a state of unprecedented lawlessness.... People now began openly to venture on acts of self-indulgence which before then they used to keep dark. Thus they resolved to spend their money quickly and to spend it on pleasure, since money and life alike seemed equally ephemeral. As for what is called honor, no one showed himself willing to abide by its laws, so doubtful was it whether one would survive to enjoy the name for it."

But the disappearance of self-restraint that can be seen all around us, especially in the culture of Hollywood and the arts, is striking and unprecedented because our society is not in crisis. Indeed never have more Americans enjoyed more wealth and security. How has this come about? What are the sources of the breakdown—as yet small, but ominous—in societal norms and civilized behavior?

It has been suggested that one source of trouble in advanced industrial societies is found in the very nature of a capitalistic economy, which promotes consumerism and materialism because of the need to sell the products produced by an ever-growing economy. While there is no doubt some truth to this thesis, one must ask why the problems appear just now, in the last third of the twentieth century, since capitalist economies and increasing prosperity are not new phenomena. Unless one believes that most people have all the products they want, it would seem that the continuing desire to improve their condition would promote hard work and self-restraint. It seems to me that a more plausible answer must be sought.

I believe that the real source of the difficulties that threaten our social fabric is something more fundamental, namely, an infection of relativism. This infection has both social and philosophical causes. On the one hand, relativism is an outgrowth of the egalitarian ethos that flourishes naturally, even inevitably, in liberal democracies such as the United States. Liberal democracy takes for granted that no individual is better than any other, and this seems to mean that the moral judgment or "value-calculus" of any person is worth as much as the moral judgment or value-calculus of any other person. Carried to its logical conclusion this egalitarianism undermines even parental authority. After all, who is to say that the judgment of a teacher or a father is superior to that of an eighteen-year-old, or for that matter a five-year-old? If the tendency toward relativism is inherent in liberal democracies, we should not be surprised that we see its effects only as time passes, since it takes generations for old habits of deference to authority to be eroded.

But relativism also has roots in certain philosophical developments at the end of the last century. Some philosophers—most notably Friedrich Nietzsche—observed that all cultures live in terms of beliefs about what is highest or most desirable. Nietzsche asserted that these beliefs are the "values" of a culture. Using history, he argued, we can now see that no culture's values are more valid than those of any other. The conclusion from the philosophers' premises was stark: All values are equally "true" or valid, but also, from another culture's perspective, equally false. This means there is no basis for claims about right and wrong, or good and bad, outside of a particular culture. There is nothing good or bad for human beings by nature, and there are no permanent moral truths.

Today this philosophy is called "postmodernism," and in one way or another it has spread widely in our culture, especially in educational institutions. For more than two generations now, students from old-fashioned backgrounds have gone off to universities where they encountered these doctrines, returning home to disabuse their parents of the primitive conviction that there is a difference between right and wrong, or good and bad.

If there is no foundation for the distinction between good and bad conduct, then there is no basis for self-restraint. After all, in the name of what should one restrain oneself? Doesn't self-restraint depend on having some conception of what is right and what is wrong, so that we can learn to restrain low impulses for the sake of higher things? If higher and lower are merely individual "values," it is easy to see that self-restraint loses its meaning. Here we come to the crux of the problem of our time, the problem described above as the collapse of belief in human nature. The view that what is good and bad for human beings is only a matter of mere "values," is identical to the view that there is no human nature. If there is no human nature, the idea of the best social order also loses its meaning.

Now, for nearly 2500 years the greatest thinkers of the Western tradition—the writers whose ideas comprise this book—devoted themselves to the task of describing the best social order, based on a careful and unbiased investigation into human nature. This enterprise—which is called political philosophy—was regarded by the greatest thinkers, from Plato to Hegel, as the most important study.

This book is my attempt at a serious yet accessible introduction to the great thinkers who planted the tree of liberty, a tree the fruits of which Americans, in particular, enjoy but take for granted. Without a doubt we live in a difficult season, and some of those fruits now fail to ripen, or when gathered, are bitter. But it is my conviction that the tree is still vital, and that we can preserve for ourselves and our children by tending to it, by learning to cherish not only the fruits, but the roots of freedom.

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1 The People Shall Judge, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. v. 2 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976), p. lviii. 3 Ibid. 4 Federalist Papers, (New York: The New American Library, 1961), No. 47, p. 301. 5 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, II. 53

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